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RECENT DECISIONS
• signed as an accommodation party. The note was executed on January 13, 1919,
and was payable one year from that date. Interest had been paid on the note
until 1932 by the principal debtors, the other co-makers. The claim against the
estate was dismissed by the county court because it was barred by the
statute of limitations. Held, on appeal, order affirmed; the accommodation maker
by "waiving notice" of renewals had not consented to payments to be made on
his behalf. In re Schinidt's Estate, (Wis. 1935) 261 N.W. 240.
Under the common law rule, payments by one co-maker tolled the statute
of limitations as to both. Cox v. Bailey, 9 Ga. 467, 54 Am. Dec. 358 (1851) ; Bur-
goon v. Bixler, 55 Md. 384, 39 Am. Rep. 417 (1881). An accommodation indorser is
not a co-obligor with the maker of a promissory note. The indorser's responsibil-
ity on a negotiable note must be fixed by presentment for payment and the
giving of notice of dishonor. Wis. STAT. (1933) §§ 116.75, 117.07. Thereafter any
conduct by the principal debtor, in the way of the payment of interest or the
acknowledging of the indebtedness, cannot toll the statute with respect to the
accommodation party without the latter's express authority. Smith v. Do'wden,
92 N.J.L. 317, 105 Atl. 720 (1919) ; and cf. Bishop v. Genz, 212 Wis. 30, 248 N.W.
771 (1933) where the accommodation party was not technically an indorser but
a "guarantor." Nor should any conduct by the accommodation indorser affect
the position of the principal debtor-maker with respect to the tolling of the
statute. Cf. White v. Pittsburgh Vein Coal Co., 266 Pa. 116, 109 Atl. 873 (1920).
The effect of payment by one co-obligor, principal debtor or accommodation
party, upon the tolling of the statute as to all is frequently covered by express
statutory provisions. See Ford v. Schall, 110 Or. 21, 221 Pac. 1052, 222 Pac. 1094
(1924). The Wisconsin statute provides that payment of interest or payment of a
part of the indebtedness by one will not affect the position of the other joint
debtor. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 330.47. But the other joint debtor can in fact con-
sent to such payment of interest and such consent will then toll the statute with
respect to both parties. Gillitzer v. Ducho'rne, 203 Wis. 269, 234 N.W. 503 (1931).
This section is not limited by express terms to cases involving principal debtors
and accommodation parties, nor to cases involving obligations evidenced by
negotiable paper. Where the joint co-makers of negotiable paper purport to agree
by provisions written onto the face of the note to all extensions and partial
payments before and after maturity without prejudice to the holder, the court
has held that such is, in effect, a power of attorney by each co-maker to the
others authorizing partial payments on behalf of all. Kline v. Fritsch, 213 Wis.
51, 250 N.W. 837 (1933). In the principal case there was literally a waiver of
notice as to extensions on the note. And the court felt that this meant the
execution by the principal debtor of a new note and the taking of that note by
the holder. The court refused to construe the literal provision with respect to
extensions as amounting to consent to the payments which the other co-debtors
had made.
WILUAM J. Nuss.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-FoRECLOSURES-CONSTITUTIONALITy OF PENALTIES IN
FoREcLosuRE STATUTES.-The plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage which was executed together with two chattel mortgages on live
stock and farm machinery as security for a $5,500 promissory note. The mort-
gagors set up as a defense the seizure without their consent of the property
covered by the chattel mortgages and the sale thereof in contravention of Sec-
tions 241.13 and 241.15 [Wis. STAT. (1933)] which provide that for any violation
of any provision thereof the owner of the equity may recover damages sus-
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tamined through the violation, and a penalty of $25, and that the "debt secured
by such mortgage shall be deemed fully satisfied and the mortgage cancelled."
The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the above
cited statutes and entered judgment cancelling the real estate mortgage of rec-
ord, dismissed the complaint, and awarded the defendant mortgagor $138 dam-
ages for the unlawful sale of the property and the $25 penalty for non-compliance
with the statutes cited. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded with directions to
apply the $138 damages and the $25 penalty to the debt and enter judgment fore-
closing the mortgage in suit; the penalizing clause of both Sections 241.13 and
241.15, is an unreasonable penalty and is therefore unconstitutional since it de-
prives the penalized party of his property without due process of law. Stierle
et al. v. Rohmeyer et al., (Wis. 1935) 260 N.W. 647.
Since 1903 two types of cases have been considered by the supreme court in
connection with this provision. In Einerson-Brantingham Irnp. Co. v. Paul, 163
Wis. 589, 158 N.W. 326 (1916), the plaintiff sued for the ballance due on a
$2,190 promissory note. Five hundred and ninety-five dollars had been paid on
the debt. The defendant mortgagor set up as a counter-claim the seizure of the
chattel and the sale thereof for $850 and the failure to file an affidavit in com-
pliance with Section 241.15. For non-compliance with the statute the $745 bal-
ance due was declared to be satisfied and the mortgage was cancelled. Cf. Ham-
reel v. Cairnes, 129 Wis. 125, 107 N.W. 1089 (1906) ; F. A. Patrick & Co. v.
Deschamp, 145 Wis. 224, 129 N.W. 1096 (1911) ; Liernman v. O'Hara, 153 Wis.
140, 140 N.W. 1057 (1913). In American Hdwe. Co. v. Moore, 177 Wis. 190, 187
N.W. 996 (1922) the action was to foreclose a real estate mortgage, $696.70
being due on the note. The defendant mortgagor set up as a counterclaim non-
compliance with Section 241.15 in the seizure and sale of a tractor and a plow
covered by a chattel mortgage given to secure the same indebtedness. For this
failure to file an affidavit as strictly prescribed in Section 241.15 the real estate
mortgage was declared by the court to be fully paid and satisfied, and the defend-
ant was awarded $25 and costs. See also Berntzon v. Edwardsen, 161 Wis. 180,
152 N.W. 832 (1915). From these cases it seems that the cancelling clause in
these two statutes has been upheld because the legislature in enacting them had
in mind only the one type of case, i.e., where the value of the chattel covered by
the mortgage given as security was in some reasonable proportion to the debt.
It is to be noted that the plaintiff mortgagee usually has purchased the chattel
at the sale on a low bid, that the court has allowed no actual damages to the
defendant mdrtgagor and in giving judgment has in effect said that the lan-
guage does not mean that the mortgagee shall lose his debt but that the con-
sideration received from the sale shall satisfy his claim against the mortgagor;
i.e., since the plaintiff has the payments made on the debt and the chattel, the
penalty is not unreasonable for his failure to comply with the statutes and the
plaintiff is not therefore deprived of his claim for protection without due process
of law.
Just how far a legislature may go in enacting a penal statute depends on the
interpretation of the word reasonable. Statutes which by their terms exact pen-
alties beyond the bounds of reason are unconstitutional. Missouri Pacific R. Co.
v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961, 57 Led. 1507 (1913). Insurance com-
panies and common carriers neglecting to satisfy valid claims within a specified
period are frequently subjected to an additional liability of a fixed percentage
of the risk plus reasonable attorneys fees. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Ten-
nessee v. McCroy, 291 U.S. 566, 54 Sup. Ct. 482, 78 L.ed. 981 (1934); Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. v. Nye, etc. Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43 Sup. Ct. 55, 67 L.ed. 115 (1922).
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It is intimated in these cases that the stipulated sum must bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the loss or inconvenience suffered by the person aggrieved. That
the exactions are severe is not decisive. The criterion seems to be whether
or not the price of error may be so heavy as to erect an unfair barrier
against the endeavor of an honest litigant to obtain the judgment of a
court. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L.ed. 741, 13 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 932 (1908).
In the principal case the court very definitely decided that it would not
enforce both the damage provisions and the forfeiture provisions of the local
chattel mortgage foreclosure statutes. Wis. STAT. (1933) F 241.13, 241.15. And
the court decided in this case to give the debtor damages only (the difference
between the estimated value of chattels and the price bid) plus the $25 penalty
without benefit of the forfeiture provisions. But the decision cannot be taken as
overruling a case like Emerson-Brantinghcnt Imp. Co. v. Paid, supra, in which
the court did carry out the forfeiture provisions of the same statutes, allowing
the twenty-five dollar penalty but no other damages when the value of the chat-
tel together with the sum already paid in by the debtor was not inconsiderable in
comparison with the amount of the original debt. In such a case, forfeiture of
the creditor's claim for the balance of the indebtedness is not an unreasonable
penalty.
WILLIAM F. HURLEY.
CORPORATIONS-DISREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITY IN FAVOR OF CREDITORS.-The
Defendant is a Michigan corporation. It owns all the stock of corporation B,
which corporation, in turn, owns all the stock of corporation A. The latter
corporation was organized by the defendant for the express purpose of entering
into a land contract with the plaintiffs. The defendant admits that this was a
device to hide its identity from the plaintiffs so that the price asked by them
for the property would not be unreasonable. The defendant, through corpora-
tion B, furnished all the operating capital for corporation A. At the time of
entering into the agreement the plaintiffs dealt solely with corporation A and
were ignorant of the defendant's interest. Separate corporate accounts were kept,
and there was no evidence of indiscriminate using or mixing of the assets of
the corporations. Corporation A defaulted on the contract. By a bill in equity
the plaintiffs now seek to have the land contract reformed, making the defend-
ant corporation the vendee thereof, and to hold the defendant liable on such
reformed contract. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff. On appeal, held,
decree reversed. Corporation A is separate and distinct from its stockholder, and
the latter cannot be held liable for corporation obligations unless it is shown
that by recognizing their separate entities a fraud upon the creditor would
result. Gledhill et al. v. Fisher & Co. et al., (Mich. 1935) 262 N.W. 371.
Whether the corporate entity should be disregarded and a corporation credi-
tor allowed to reach through and hold personally responsible the sole stock-
holder or holding company is a question to be decided solely upon the peculiar
facts of a specific case. In the instant case the Michigan court seems to feel that
the mixing of assets of the corporations is an important consideration in decid-
ing the question. If the assets of the corporations or of the corporation and the
sole stockholder (or stockholders, as in the case of a partnership) are mixed
and used indiscriminately, the creditor of the insolvent corporation should be
permitted to reach such assets. In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609
(S.D. Ohio, 1907) ; In re Collins, 75 F. (2d) 62 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934) ; Donovan v.
